The nature of persistence over time has been intensely debated in contemporary metaphysics. The two opposite views are widely known as "endurantism" (or "three-dimensionalism") and "perdurantism" ("four-dimensionalism"). According to the former, objects are extended in three spatial dimensions and persist through time by being wholly present at any moment at which they exist. On the rival account, objects are extended both in space and time and persist by having "temporal parts," no part being present at more than one time.
.
Persistence over time has become a hot topic in contemporary metaphysics. Two rival accounts of persistence of material objects through time are currently on the market: endurantism (aka threedimensionalism, 3D) and perdurantism (aka four-dimensionalism, 4D, or the doctrine of temporal parts). 1 Objects endure if they persist by being wholly present at different moments of time. One and the same object can be entirely present at t 1 , then it can be entirely present at t 2 ; when it is at t 2 , it is no longer present at t 1 , neither is any part of it. On this view, objects are three-dimensional entities that do not have "temporal extension."
Objects are said to perdure if they persist by virtue of having temporal parts, or stages, at different times, no part being fully present at more than one time. On this view, objects are actually four-dimensional: they are extended both in space and time. Persistence is not a matter of strict transtemporal identity, because, in the four-dimensional ontology, nothing can be present at two different times. Instead of literal identity over time, we have to speak of a mereological relation being a temporal part of the same 4D entity as.
Relativistic considerations seem highly relevant to the 3D/4D debate. But they have played little role in it so far. In fact the debate largely proceeds as if there were no theory of relativity around. This paper seeks to repair that situation. I argue that relativistic considerations strongly favor perdurantism (that is, 4D) over endurantism (3D). My strategy is the following. I take the essential idea of endurantism, that objects are entirely present at single moments of time, and show that it commits one to unacceptable conclusions regarding coexistence, in the context of SR. I propose and discuss two plausible accounts of coexistence for perduring objects, which are free of these defects. The relativistic framework proves, not surprisingly, almost ready-made for the 4D ontology but rather hostile to the endurantist. I conclude that she can accommodate the notion of coexistence in this framework only at the cost of renouncing central endurantist intuitions 1 The terms "endurantism" and "perdurantism" are originally due to Mark Johnston and David Lewis. See Lewis 1986 , 202, Johnston 1987 . On the perdurantism-endurantism debate see, e.g., Armstrong 1980 , Haslanger 1989ab, Heller 1990 , van Inwagen 1990 , Carter and Hestevold 1994 , Merricks 1994 , 1995 For useful definitions of the notions of 'temporal part' and 'being wholly present at t' see, especially, Markosian 1994 , Zimmerman 1996 
The notion of coexistence is central to the metaphysics of objects, just as the notion of becoming is central to the metaphysics of events and to the philosophy of time. Whereas becoming is a fundamental relation between or among events, coexistence is an equally fundamental relation between or among objects. Coexistence is to object as becoming is to events.
I take it to be uncontroversial that any reasonable ontology of objects must accommodate the concept of coexistence. This assumption is quite general and neutral with respect to the endurance versus perdurance controversy. The endurantist and the perdurantist would certainly want to construe coexistence (or the lack of it) differently. But no one of them would be willing to deny, on pain of solipsism, that she coexists with various objects-tables and chairs, as well as other persons-and no one would be inclined to admit that, in any interesting sense of coexistence, she coexists with all of them indiscriminately. Whether objects endure or perdure, there must be a sense of the coexistence relation such that I bear this relation to Bill Clinton but not to Napoleon.
Both parties to the debate about persistence would agree that coexistence must be a non-trivial relation between objects.
They would, however, disagree on the way in which the notion of time must figure in the concept of coexistence. The endurantist concept of coexistence is tensed or "temporally-loaded" in a way in which the perdurantist one is not. It is tensed, because it holds between entities that change their positions in space-time and, consequently, coexistence itself becomes a function of time. If I am an enduring object, then I coexist with another enduring object always at a particular time at which I am wholly present. For example, if I am wholly present today, then I coexist with Clinton wholly present today but not with Clinton wholly present tomorrow.
The perdurantist notion of coexistence is different because it holds between entities that do not change their locations with time. Such entities are either 3D (spatio-)temporal parts of 4D things or four-dimensional wholes "permanently" confined to their spatio-temporal locations.
There is no question here of something coming to coexist with something else. If I am a perduring object, I cannot say that I came to coexist with Bill Clinton when I was born, and that this coexistence will cease to take place when one of us dies. This would be appropriate if I were a 3D object that can be wholly present at more than one time. But four-dimensional entities do not really come to be or go out of existence. Each of them just has a particular temporal extension. Whether such entities coexist is a completely tenseless, or atemporal, issue.
The task of the endurantist, therefore, is to provide a tensed, or temporally-loaded (in this special sense), and non-trivial notion of coexistence in the context of SR, and the task of the perdurantist is to provide a tenseless such notion. I argue below that, whereas the perdurantist can easily fulfil her task, the endurantist confronts difficulties in the attempt to do justice both to special relativity and the 3D ontology.
I'd like to start by making a useful idealization and imposing certain general requirements on the notion of coexistence.
Idealization: From now on we will be dealing with point-like enduring and perduring objects, which do not have spatial extension. This does not detract from the generality of the analysis but makes it much simpler.
Symmetricity:
The coexistence relation C must be symmetric. An account on which x coexists with y, C(x, y), but y does not coexist with x, ~C(y, x), would hardly have anything to do with the notion of coexistence. 2 Objectivity: Given two objects (or their momentary parts, in case of perdurantism) having particular locations in space-time, there must be a fact of the matter about their coexistence.
Consider two point-like enduring objects E1 and E2 and their world lines representing their spatio-temporal careers in space-time. The endurantist would certainly want to say that, in a wide variety of cases, these objects would coexist. What are necessary conditions of the coexistence of E1 and E2? Given that enduring objects are wholly present at single points of their histories, they cannot coexist unless they are, in some sense, co-present to one another. To put it differently, coexistence of enduring objects must be grounded in some relation R between their momentary spatio-temporal locations O1 and O2-a relation that would express the fact of their co-presence.
In the classical neo-Newtonian framework, co-presence was entirely unproblematic. E1 and E2 could be said to coexist just in case they both exist at the same time, or belong to the same "present." More formally, neo-Newtonian space-time is uniquely decomposable into the set S of hyperplanes of absolute simultaneity, S = { HPS t abs }, where t abs is the absolute Newtonian time.
In this pre-relativistic framework, relation R could be defined as follows:
and the corresponding principle of coexistence for enduring objects would be ('N' standing for "Newtonian"):
(CE N ) Two enduring objects coexist iff they are co-present to one another, that is, iff their locations belong to the same HPS t abs :
Here 'E1 O1 ' and 'E2 O2 ' denote enduring objects E1 and E2 located at O1 and O2 respectively. The relation of coexistence CE N defined in this way is symmetric because it is grounded in the
). In general, on this pre-relativistic view, every enduring object coexists with any other by virtue of being co-present with it in every reference frame.
Turning now to the perdurantist ontology, one could formulate two distinct principles of coexistence in the classical framework.
(CP 1 N ) Two momentary parts of perduring objects coexist iff they are co-present to one
another, that is, iff their locations belong to the same HPS t abs :
Here 'P1 O1 ' and 'P2 O2 ' denote momentary parts of two perduring objects P1 and P2 located at O1
and O2 respectively. CP 1 N is symmetric and transitive.
The perdurantist may also be interested in another notion of coexistence applying to entire 4D objects, rather than to their momentary 3D parts:
(CP 2 N ) Two perduring objects coexist iff they have co-present momentary parts whose locations belong to the same HPS
To put it informally, four-dimensional perduring objects related by CP 2 N temporally "overlap." These simple accounts of coexistence become inadequate in the relativistic context where there is no place for absolute simultaneity. Two enduring objects, or two momentary parts of perduring objects, may be "co-present" (that is, their spatio-temporal locations may be simultaneous) in one (inertial) reference frame but not in another. To express their coexistence, one can no longer rely on relation R N holding in every reference frame if it holds in any. This does not mean that no other relation R can be singled out to ground the coexistence of objects (or of their parts) in an objective and relevant way. In it clear, however, that all such relations must themselves be grounded in the invariant structures of Minkowski space-time.
.
The most natural candidate for R is surely the relation of space-like separation:
This suggests the following candidate principles of coexistence for enduring and perduring objects (and the latter's parts) in Minkowski space-time:
(CE) Two enduring objects coexist iff their locations are space-like separated:
(CP 1 ) Two parts of perduring objects coexist iff their locations are space-like separated:
(CP 2 ) Two perduring objects coexist iff they have space-like separated parts:
We now have to investigate whether each of these candidates is acceptable as a principle of coexistence for a corresponding type of entity in the relativistic context. Let us begin with CP 2 .
Being a relativistic counterpart of CP 2 N , it expresses the idea of "overlap" in a Lorentz-invariant language: instead of a literal temporal overlap, it refers to a relativistic "overlap" of the light cones The relation of coexistence governed by CP 2 is objective in the sense specified above: given two perduring objects, there is a fact of the matter about their coexistence ("overlap"). CP 2 is obviously symmetric. Just like its classical counterpart, it is not transitive. But this is good news:
If CP 2 were transitive, it would hold between any two perduring objects whatsoever and thus be trivial.
CP 1 does not fare equally well in this regard. Whereas relation CP 1 N expressed by its prerelativistic counterpart is transitive, that expressed by CP 1 is not. But in making a transition to the relativistic context, one has to be prepared-regardless of whether one is an endurantist or a perdurantist-to make some changes in the notion of coexistence. One should not expect this notion to emerge completely intact from the transition at hand. On the contrary, there is no sense in which any momentary part of the four-dimensional
Crab Nebula "comes" to coexist with any part of me. There is also no sense in which the whole perduring Crab Nebula ever comes to coexist with any other perduring object in the universe.
Four-dimensional objects and their parts do not change their spatio-temporal locations in the way three-dimensional enduring objects do. Their coexistence, as regulated by CP 1 and CP 2 , is a tenseless, or atemporal, notion.
The difference, as we shall see in a moment, is crucial. It raises serious problems for the endurantist wishing to adhere to 3D ontology in the context of SR. To get a sense of these problems, notice that whereas on CP 1 , a given part of one perduring object can coexist, as already mentioned, with many parts of another perduring object, a given enduring object can, on CE, coexist with another enduring object more than once. Thus, E2 coexists with E1 located at O1 both when E2 is at O2
(1) and when it is at O2 (2) (Figure 2 ), because both O2 (1) and O2 (2) are spacelike separated from O1. This, as I will show in a moment, is troublesome. The trouble comes, in effect, from the "if" part of CE. To respect both the endurantist ontology and special relativity, CE introduces a peculiar combination of tensed and tenseless elements. On the one hand (as already mentioned), the coexistence relation it espouses is not tenseless in the way the relations governed by CP 1 and CP 2 are. On CE, it is imperative, from the point of view of E1, to ask when it coexists with E2:
E1 coexists with E2 always at a given moment-for example, when E1 is at O1, as in Figure 2 .
On the other hand, CE seeks to meet the relativistic requirements by denying what CE N asserts, namely, that coexistence of E1 and E2 hinges on there being a fact of the matter as to where (on its world line) E2 is when E1 is, say, at O1. E2 may be at any point in the elsewhere of O1, that is, outside the past and future light cones of O1. E2, in fact, fully exists at all such points at different times (as measured by its clock) and at all such times it coexists with E1, when the latter is at O1.
The denial that, when E1 is at O1, other enduring objects coexisting with it must be at some particular points on their world lines commits the endurantist to a certain ontological latitude that is potentially damaging in a way the corresponding latitude sanctioned by the perdurantist principle CP 2 is not. A cure, I will argue, can be purchased only at the cost of renouncing some important endurantist intuitions.
Certain enduring things, but no perduring ones, come to be and cease to exist. In-between, they enter into various relations of coexistence with other enduring things. For a given enduring object, the changing relations of coexistence it enters into during its life career provide a changing perspective on the rest of the existence, a dynamic "window" through which such an object "views" the world.
To make these ideas precise, let us introduce the notion of Coexistence* 5 based on a straightforward generalization of CE*.
(CE*) An enduring object E2 coexists* with E1 fully present at O1 just in case there is a point O2 such that E2 is fully present at O2 and O2 is space-like separated from O1:
Another way to express the idea of Coexistence* is by saying that E2 coexists* with E1 fully present at O1 if and only if the "elsewhere" of O1 includes some part of E2's world line.
To illustrate, Gorbachev, but neither his vigorous critic Sakharov, nor Gorbachev's greatgrandson, coexists* with me-now ( Gorbachev's great-grandson is born Fig. 3 . I coexist*, on 24 October 1998, with Gorbachev, but not with Sakharov or Gorbachev's great-grandson.
paper deal primarily with objective-monadic and relational-matters of fact, not with subjective phenomena, such as perceptions of those facts by conscious beings. 5 An asterisk is needed to distinguish Coexistence* from the notion of coexistence at work in CE. 6 I have made, of course, no attempt to draw diagrams, such as Figure 3 , "to scale." I submit that the endurantist who wants to adjust his views to the relativistic context needs the notion of Coexistence*, because this notion allows him to preserve, in that context, important tense-involving intuitions regarding the transient existence of objects other than himself-objects such as Gorbachev and Sakharov, which come to be and cease to exist. The point of introducing Coexistence* is to provide a relativistic basis for a belief to which, arguably, the endurantist is committed: that the existence of other transient things goes hand in hand with her coexistence with them.
In the old pre-relativistic setting, if I am an enduring object fully present at a particular time, there is a sense in which all other transient enduring beings sort themselves out into three different categories: those that no longer exist (e.g., Sakharov), those that are still or already in existence (e.g., Gorbachev), and those that do not yet exist (e.g., Gorbachev's great-grandson). It is clear that, in the neo-Newtonian framework, this difference with respect to existence is grounded in the fact that only objects in the second category, and not those in the first and in the third ones, bear a certain relation of coexistence with me-now, namely, the relation of coexistence N *, which is the pre-relativistic analog of Coexistence*: CE N *: An enduring object E2 coexists N * with E1 fully present at O1 just in case there is a point O2 belonging to the same HPS t abs as O1 (or, simply, absolutely simultaneous with O1), such that E2 is fully present at O2:
What reason do I have to assert, on 24 October 1998, that Gorbachev, but not Sakharov, is still in existence? The reason seems clear: Gorbachev, but not Sakharov, coexists N * with me-now.
Coexistence N * supplies a necessary link between Gorbachev's continuing existence and Sakharov's being no longer in existence, on the one hand, and my existence today, on the other.
The concept of Coexistence* does precisely the same job in the relativistic framework, by building, not on the relation of absolute simultaneity (no longer valid in that framework), but on the Lorentz-invariant relation of space-like separation. If I am an enduring object fully present at a particular time and place, there is a sense in which some other transient enduring objects exist no longer (Sakharov) or not yet (Gorbachev's great-grandson)-because they do not bear the relation CE* to me-now, whereas yet others are still or already in existence (Gorbachev)-because they do coexist* with me-now.
To be sure, Coexistence*, just like its ancestor from CE, conflicts with some of our Newtonian predilections, because it is relativized, not only to time, but also to space. Like its Quite unlike Coexistence N *, however, Coexistence* makes the distinction among determinations "still (already) in existence," "no longer in existence," and "not yet in existence"
relative to a spatial, as well as temporal, location. Speaking metaphorically, one can "revive"
Sakharov not only by "going" back in time, but also by "going" further away in space. This is a natural cost (or benefit?) of replacing neo-Newtonian space-time with the relativistic one. Notice, in this connection, that for an enduring object fully present at a certain point of its life career somewhere on Betelgeuse, both Clinton and Napoleon are in existence, the former existing already and the latter still. Alexander the Great, however, is no longer, and Miss America 3000 not yet.
The point is that, although "still in existence" and "already in existence" become, in the Minkowski world, relative to a spatio-temporal perspective and not to a merely temporal one (as they were in the Newtonian world), the question of what objects are still or already in existence admits of a definite answer from any such perspective. Thanks to CE and its direct descendant, CE*, the important distinction between things that are (from the point of view of any enduring object at any point of its spatio-temporal career) still or already in existence and those that are not (any longer or yet) has a firm grounding in the invariant structure of Minkowski space-time.
It is now time to reveal the pernicious side of these temporal determinations. But clearly, there is no tensed sense in which they can be in existence together: Sakharov's beginning lies in the absolute future of his great-grandfather's end. My conclusion, informed as it is by relativistic considerations, is in strange discord with that relativistically-invariant fact ( Figure   5 ).
7 By "going" away in space, I can become, in a sense, a "contemporary" of Napoleon. But of course, there is a rather innocent tenseless sense, appropriate for the perdurantist ontology, in which Sakharov and his great-grandson are both in existence and one of my parts coexists-P* with both. 'Coexists-P*' here refers to the perdurantist counterpart of Coexistence* governed by the following principle:
(CP*) A perduring object P2 coexists-P* with the O1-part of another perduring object P1 iff P2 has a part located at a point O2 space-like separated from O1: CP* (P2, P1
My O-part, Sakharov's last part, and his great-grandson's first part all exist atemporally in Minkowski world and are related in a manner that does not imply any troubling tensed determinations, such as "still" and "already." It is not the case that Sakharov's great-grandson already exists and Sakharov himself still does. They simply exist, as being forever confined to their spatio-temporal regions, and the fact that my O-part coexists-P* with both is a further tenseless fact about Sakharov, his great-grandson, and a part of me. is the most important fact about my existence, a fact firm enough to ground my perspective on the existence of everything else. To the extent that endurantism may succeed in incorporating an interesting notion of coexistence in the relativistic framework, this notion becomes the only bridge that connects the existence of a given enduring object with the rest of the universe. But this bridge turns out to be too wide. It connects me with things that cannot be in existence together in any temporally-loaded sense of "together."
Both endurantism and perdurantism emerge whittled-down out of the transition from the classical to the relativistic conception of space and time. But they are whittled-down to a very different extent. Both views of persistence must abandon the transitivity of the coexistence relation. Having paid this price, the perdurantist discovers, to her satisfaction, that, not only do the troubles stop at this point, but that the new spatio-temporal framework, that of Minkowski space-time, appears to be rather friendly to her, indeed, almost ready-made for accommodating her inherently tenseless ontology. For the endurantist, however, the troubles only begin here. The
Minkowski world, having no place in it for absolute simultaneity, presents the endurantist with a dilemma: either to renounce all the tensed implications of her central idea of an object's being fully present at a time (and place), or to endorse these implications and be committed to conclusions that are generally disconcerting 8 and in some cases outrightly contradictory. 9 Neither horn of the dilemma is acceptable for the endurantist. Or so I have argued.
